To both professional soldiers and historians, the causes of the German catastrophe in Eastern Europe in the years from 1941 to 1945 will forever remain an absorbing problem.

The Russo-German conflict, taken as a whole, has been neglected by historians. The Soviet authorities did release their own official histories, but these, while lavish with minor details, remain tantalizingly silent at certain points of crises. And there is no official material comparable to that which the British and United States authorities allow to students of their campaigns. The scale of such other works as exists is often very small or else it consists of personal memoirs, and is subject to the limitations of viewpoint and objectivity that are inseparable from this form.

The Russians, although their official accounts are clear and factual, have’ reservations. In common with other authoritarian regimes, the Soviets have reputations that must not be disturbed and mythology to cherish. Yet this study will show neither of these excuses have validity.

In this book Paul Carell, the well known military historian, presents an analytical study of the Russo-Gean War and succeeds to the full, with amazing clarity and unanswerable logic.